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a b s t r a c t
During the last decade, conservation banking mechanisms have emerged in the environmental discourse
as new market instruments to promote biodiversity conservation. Compensation was already provided
for in environmental law in many countries, as the last step of the mitigation hierarchy. The institutional
arrangements developed in this context have been redeﬁned and reshaped as market-based instruments
(MBIs). As such, they are discursively disentangled from the complex legal-economic nexus they are part
of. Monetary transactions are given prominence and tend to be presented as stand alone agreements,
whereas they take place in the context of prescriptive regulations. The pro-market narrative featuring
conservation banking systems as market-like arrangements as well as their denunciation as instances of
nature commodiﬁcation tend to obscure their actual characteristics.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the latter, adopting an explicitly analytical stance on these
complex institutional arrangements and their performative dimensions. Beyond the discourse supporting
them and notwithstanding the diversity of national policies and regulatory frameworks for compensation,
the constitutive force of these mechanisms probably lies in their ability to redeﬁne control, power and the
distribution of costs and in their impacts in terms of land use rather than in their efﬁciency.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
During the last decade, conservation banking mechanisms have
emerged at least in the environmental discourse as allegedly new
market instruments to promote biodiversity conservation (Madsen
et al., 2010, 2011). However compensationwas already provided for in
environmental law in many countries, as the last step of the
mitigation hierarchy. Since mitigation measures were most of the
time accomplished on site and in kind, they were considered as
technical components of development projects rather than as a policy
instrument. Compensatory mitigationwas conducted on a project-by-
project basis, under the control of the authorities in charge of wildlife
and protected areas without global scheme and away from public
exposure.
New representations and expectations have been progressively
attached to this policy, following the changes in wetland mitigation
policy in the United States during the 1990s (Robertson, 2000, 2004,
2006) and the setting of the no-net-loss objective. With this slogan
promoted by the Bush Administration, full offsetting of the projected
ecological loss associated with wetland destruction became the
explicit goal of mitigation policies. The mitigation banking mechanism
was developed to provide compensation for adverse impacts to wet-
lands and other aquatic resources in advance of the impact. Wetlands
were to some extent commoditized through a process that has been
described by Robertson (2000) as an “incomplete capitalization of
nature”. Narratives of market, science, and technique have played an
important role in this institutional innovation. The development of
market-style ﬂexibility mechanisms in mitigation policies has been
explicitly linked to expectations associated with restoration science
and practice. As stressed in “expectations studies” recently developed
in the ﬁeld of social studies of science, technology and society (STS)
(Borup et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2000, Brown, 2003), expectations act
as constitutive forces, they create promissory commitment that
become part of a shared agenda and thus require action. In this case,
the promise of no net loss (NNL) – i.e. the theoretical possibility of
conciliation between economic development and environmental
protection without trade-offs or compromises thanks to ecological
restoration techniques (Brownlie et al., 2013) – has been central in
brokering relationships between actors. NNL goal stands for an
optimum policy that would ensure a perfect balance between the
maintenance of natural capital – an environmental status quo, without
further degradation – and economic growth, through the implemen-
tation of land development projects and the expansion of an expertise
sector – brokers, consultants – dedicated to mitigation. The promis-
sory abstraction of ecological equivalence has taken substance and has
become materially embedded into speciﬁc institutional arrangements
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that have been called “mitigation banks”. The vocabulary used to
describe these mechanisms – banks, bankers, credits, debits, etc. – and
the associated legal framework are eloquent testimony to the under-
lying neoliberal vision. Mitigation banking is described as a market-
based instrument (MBI), and as such is expected rather than demon-
strated to be efﬁcient, transparent, to favour the development of
routines, to foster long-term conservation at ecologically sound scales,
and to reduce transaction costs.
Conservation banking emerged in the United States in the mid-
1990s as an attempt to adapt wetland mitigation banking frame-
work to the protection of endangered species. In 1995, the State of
California established the ﬁrst conservation banks, to preserve
existing habitats. At the Federal level, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (2003) adopted a “Guidance for the establishment, use,
and operation of conservation banks”, hereafter the Guidance, in
May 2003. Similar programmes have been adopted from the end
of the 1990s worldwide (Australia, Brazil, South Africa, Europe).
Beyond their diversity, the arguments used to promote them draw
upon similar representations and discourses about market efﬁ-
ciency and the promises of ecological restoration.
Mitigation banking and conservation banking schemes are some-
times jointly addressed under the heading of habitat banking (Bean
et al., 2008), especially in literature-based surveys or theorizing about
MBIs. ‘No net loss’ and even ‘net gain’ or ‘net positive impact’ are
often discussed in relation to conservation banking as if the com-
pliance regimes for biodiversity offsets always had such explicit
objectives (BBOP 2012, 2013; Bull et al., 2013; Coggan et al., 2013).
This conﬂation between different policy instruments and institutional
arrangements is misleading. It is indisputable that conservation
banking has been inspired by mitigation banking, yet it would be
delusive to consider them as identical. They fall within the scope of
different legislative instruments and policy frameworks, their objec-
tives are materially different, the agencies in charge of the imple-
mentation of the policy are not the same and they have different
intervention cultures and representations of the environment. As set
out below, it is therefore improper to apply without due discrimina-
tion to conservation banking the results and conclusions drawn from
the analysis of mitigation banking systems.
Conservation banking schemes have been redeﬁned and reshaped
asMBIs from themid 1990s. As such, they are discursively disentangled
from the complex legal-economic nexus they are part of. Monetary
transactions are given prominence and tend to be presented as stand
alone agreements whereas they take place in the context of prescrip-
tive regulations and broad-ranging conventions, leading to what Brand
and Vadrot (2013) call ‘epistemic selectivities’.1 Conservation banking
systems are entrenched into regulatory frameworks that give them
meaning and that should not be disregarded. The pro-market narrative
featuring them as market-like arrangements as well as their denuncia-
tion as instances of nature commodiﬁcation tend to obscure their
actual characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to describe the latter,
adopting an explicitly analytical stance on these complex institutional
arrangements and questioning their economic status.
Conservation banking systems are very diverse, and even within a
country, the principles laid down in regulations are actualized
through varied institutional arrangements. The aim of this paper is
not to draw up an inventory or a typology of these arrangements, but
rather to identify their common institutional features beyond their
diversity, based on an analysis of the legal framework governing
them, building on Polanyi’s concept of ‘ﬁctitious commodities’ and on
the literature on the neoliberalization of nature in radical geography
(e.g. Harvey, 2007; Castree, 2003, 2010a, 2010b).
The ﬁrst part of this paper will be devoted to a critical appraisal of
the notions of MBIs and markets as used in designing environmental
policy instrumentation. Several key features or criteria deﬁning MBIs
will be deﬁned and the major steps of the commodiﬁcation process
leading to market creation will be identiﬁed. These elements will
direct an assessment of the conservation banking sector. This part will
be followed by a discussion of the economic status of the institutional
arrangements into which ideal expectations of markets and ecological
equivalence are materially scripted.
2. Commodiﬁcation, markets and market-based instruments:
The nature of the markets for nature
Whereas many environmental policy tools are categorized as
market-based instruments, this notion is paradoxically ill deﬁned
from an analytical point of view. This category is not reﬂected in a
substantive deﬁnition. The characterization of mechanisms as MBIs
arises from projected qualities and expectations – efﬁciency in
resource allocation and an explicit reliance on market regulation –
rather than from their objective attributes. These instruments are
described as “harnessing market forces” (Hockenstein et al., 1997).
Some authors consider in addition that they would fall within price
rather than quantity regulation. As deﬁned by Hockenstein et al.
(1997): 14, “Market-based instruments are regulatory devices that
shape behaviors through price signals rather than explicit instructions
on pollution control levels of measure”. However, this proposal for a
deﬁnition does not withstand scrutiny: tradable permits, including
credit programs and cap-and-trade systems, that are always identiﬁed
as MBIs in typologies of policy instruments are a form of quantity
regulation. In fact, this category is most of the time addressed through
a negative deﬁnition, and opposed to “command-and-control” app-
roaches, which are equated to pure regulation conjuring up visions of
inefﬁciency, administrative burden, and rigidity. In setting uniform
technical standards, “command-and-control” instruments would force
all ﬁrms to shoulder identical share of the mitigation burden,
regardless of their differences in terms of cost structure and technol-
ogy and would therefore provide little incentive to spare resources.
The concept of MBI was initially articulated and brought to the
fore in relation to environmental policies by Stavins (1988, 1991) in a
report to the U.S. Congress entitled Project 88, and he has further
developed it ever since (e.g., Stavins, 1998). The category of MBIs as
deﬁned by Stavins includes various instruments that are all featured
as economic incentives: tradable permits, charge systems (e.g.,
efﬂuent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, sales taxes),
market friction reductions (i.e. market creation, liability rules and
information programmes), and government subsidy reductions
(removal of perverse incentives). This is a broad categorization; some
of these elements can hardly be described as ‘instruments’. The
development of environmental liability has its own rationale going
beyond market framing. These so-called instruments do not make a
coherent whole from a theoretical point of view. Nor do they convey a
shared vision of environmental externalities.
Until the inception of the concept of MBIs and its breakthrough in
relation to the provision and management of ecosystem services,
environmental policy instruments were split into two broad groups
according to their theoretical foundations (OECD, 1989). The major
divide was between Pigouvian taxes – implying the intervention of the
State or of a regulatory body to internalize externalities – and the
economic instruments, also called market incentives and associated
with a Coasian setting—tradable permits, and various contractual
instruments. In surveys of environmental policies and their theoretical
background (e.g., Cropper and Oates, 1992) the imposition of legal
liability for damages to the environment was also considered, and the
authors pointed to the practical importance of the locus of envi-
ronmental regulatory authority. This partitioning and the underlying
1 Brand and Vadrot (2013): 207 deﬁne epistemic selectivities as “those
mechanisms within political institutions that favour speciﬁc forms of knowledge,
problem perceptions and narratives over others.”
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references are still structuring the periodical surveys of environmental
policy instruments edited by the OECD.
Deﬁning an environmental policy instrument as a MBI does not
say much about its intrinsic characteristics and properties. It rather
reveals the cost-efﬁciency expectations attached to its adoption, and
potentially a subscription to the liberal market ideal. Pleading for
MBIs’ development is therefore vague as a policy prescription and
cannot provide precise criteria against which institutional change,
the resulting arrangements, and their performance could be assessed.
In this respect, the concept of MBIs is similar to the concept of market
in economics.
2.1. Setting up markets for biodiversity: The steps towards
commodiﬁcation
The conceptualization of market is the core of economic theory; it
represents the ideal type and the reference in terms of efﬁciency in
resource allocation. Yet the economic theory is not very explicit about
the terms and conditions of its actualization and its practical imp-
lementation. Unless if taking a cue from Hayek one considers that
markets arise spontaneously, their creation implies institutional
framing, the identiﬁcation of actors, the delineation of commodities,
and the setting up of trading devices. Real-life markets are not pure
abstractions, and they are deeply enmeshed in social, cultural,
political and legal processes and materially embedded into structures.
These dimensions are studied in economic sociology. In this ﬁeld,
‘market devices’ deﬁned as “a simple way of referring to the material
and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of
markets” (Muniesa et al., 2007: 2) are one of the main subjects of
study. Market creation implies the deﬁnition of the commodity to be
traded and of the property rights of the parties involved. It requires
the setting up of institutional arrangements effectively matching
supply and demand. Regardless of the institutional conﬁguration of
the market, economic agents are assumed to be free to allocate their
resources as they wish, and to engage in transactions or not. Their
involvement in commercial exchange is voluntary. Finally, however
the market is conceptualized, it is characterized by a price, deter-
mined by the law of supply and demand at a global level and
independent from the contingencies of individual transactions, espe-
cially from the material setting in which they take place and the
personal and social relationships among the actors involved.
As has been highlighted in the literature on the commodiﬁca-
tion of nature (e.g., Castree, 2003, 2010a, 2010b; Gómez-Baggethun
and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011), the environmental markets differ from
conventional markets in that they deal with ‘ﬁctitious commod-
ities’ in the Polanyian sense, disembedded from wider social and
ecological relations to be turned into tradable assets (Polanyi,
1944). Their (re)deﬁnition as commodities bears witness to capi-
talist expansion and to the creation of new resource frontiers
through a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to quote
Harvey (2003). The commodiﬁcation of elements of biodiversity
involves a series of operations (adapted from Castree, 2003):
– Individuation of the prospective assets, implying the creation of
conceptual and material boundaries, and the splitting of
ecosystem into legally deﬁned and tradable entities that are
most of the time property rights to speciﬁc resources or
services;
– Reiﬁcation resulting in the alienability of the biodiversity
elements, in their being materially and culturally separable
from the ecosystems and from their owners if any, who are
deﬁned in the process as potential sellers;
– Abstraction, which aims at setting individual things as equiva-
lent, or ‘making things the same’ to quote McKenzie (2009),
describing how different gases had been made commensurable
and how accountants had struggled to deﬁne a standard
treatment of emissions rights in preparation for carbon mar-
kets. Turning social facts and elements of biodiversity into
‘things’ necessitates to set up ‘conventions of equivalence’
(Desrosières, 1998; Espeland and Stevens, 1998), i.e. to produce
statistics, averages, standard deviations, correlations, probabil-
ity, identical categories. The production of types depends on
inventories, lists, classiﬁcation, and standardization of natural
habitats. Abstraction also implies to disentangle the elements
of biodiversity from the ecosystems and the particular location
or site they are embedded in. These elements are at least
conceptually isolated from the socioecological dynamics they
are involved in.
– Measurement, quantiﬁcation, search for metrics and currencies,
i.e. the deﬁnition of fungible units of trade. This issue and step
of the social construction of species or habitats as assets is
closely related to the previous one and proves especially
challenging in the case of biodiversity and ecosystem services,
as illustrated by Salzman and Ruhl (2000). A classiﬁcation of
these elements should be deﬁned so as to allow commensur-
ability and substitution among the entities belonging to the
same category regardless of their location, but the ecological
and social values of biodiversity are site speciﬁc and changing.
2.2. Commodiﬁcation, capitalization or economization?
As already mentioned, Robertson (2000) described the develop-
ment of mitigation banking as a process of incomplete capitalization
of nature. In the case of conservation banking, the process is not only
unﬁnished, it is more fundamentally difﬁcult to deﬁne and label. The
conservation banking mechanisms that have developed through-
out the world are all based on the sale and purchase of very speciﬁc
credits. The assessment procedures are not standardized and are
highly context dependent, as discussed below, resulting in each
transaction being unique. There is no market, properly speaking, for
biodiversity or species credits since there is no generalized and
centralized system for the exchange of homogeneous credits, and
the deal ﬂow is too limited to build up mutual trust, to share
information, and to settle transactions into a routine.
With this in mind, we could hazard a new deﬁnition of MBIs, as
instances of uncompleted processes of nature commodiﬁcation, or
to put the question another way focusing on their performative
dimensions, as instances of economization of nature. As deﬁned by
Çalişkan and Callon (2009): 370 economization is “a term used to
denote the processes that constitute the behaviours, organizations,
institutions and, more generally, the objects in a particular society
which are tentatively and often controversially qualiﬁed, by sch-
olars and/or lay people, as ‘economic’. The construction of action
(-ization) into the word implies that the economy is an achieve-
ment rather than a starting point or a pre-existing reality that can
simply be revealed and acted upon.”
The economic status of conservation banking devices cannot be
fully understood without an outline of the economization process at
stake in the development of this policy instrument. A major analytical
challenge to address lies in the identiﬁcation of the traded entity. In
other terms, it should be determined what these transactions mean,
what the credits stand for, and what precisely gives rise to payments.
Can the amount paid to purchase credits be regarded as a price? Is it
rather an ex-post compensation, or a form of regularisation? Is habitat
destruction authorized once compensatory mitigation measures have
successfully been implemented or is the permit issued against the
credible promise of appropriate habitat restoration or preservation?
How are uncertainties about future impacts and the success of
restoration dealt with in quantifying debits and credits? Another
important aspect of the deﬁnition of the economic status of conserva-
tion banking mechanisms relates to property rights. Indeed, the
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property rights over commodities must be well deﬁned for trade to be
possible. According to the theory of property rights, all trade can be
considered as an exchange of property rights. The institutional arra-
ngements governing conservation banking should be described in all
their complexity: by unfolding the rights and correlative obligations of
the land developers and bank managers but also by unveiling the
bundle of relationships and transactions in which they are enshrined.
Some of these transactions are monetary; others are regulatory rather
than economic. Some agreements are ﬁnalized before the exchange
of credits, other afterwards. Many different actors engage in these
transactions: various public authorities, land developers, bank man-
agers, landowners, brokers, legal and environmental consultants,
ecological restoration specialists. The description of the bundle of
agreements among them can reveal to what extent the purchase of
credits in a conservation banking system can be considered as a
voluntary transaction.
These questions cannot be addressed only theoretically. They
should be considered in actual institutional settings through case
studies, because as acknowledged in the introduction of the Guidance
“no two conservation banks will be used or developed in an identical
fashion.” The following sections give an overview of issues and sketch
out some potential directions for a future research agenda.
3. Conservation banking through a market lens
Numerous articles and publications have recently focused on the –
short – history of conservation banking in the United States, from the
emergence of wetland mitigation banking through the transfer of the
concept to threatened species conservation with the beginning of
conservation banking in California during the mid-1990s (e.g., Bauer
et al., 2004; Bean et al., 2008; Carroll et al., 2008). Otherwise a great
deal of research has been devoted to the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
of 1973 and its implementation, especially in the ﬁeld of law and
economics, in relation to property issues (e.g., Houck, 1993, 1995;
Innes, 1997; Thomson, 1997; Polasky et al., 1997). Experiences from
different countries in terms of biodiversity, species or habitat banking
have also been reviewed (e.g., Burgin, 2008; McKenney and Kiesecker,
2009).
Conservation banking has ﬁrst developed and been studied in the
United States, but the socio-political paths followed by other countries
that have developed domestic versions of this instrument are more or
less similar. Until the mid-1990s, compensatory measures were a
technical step in a compulsory mitigation procedure. Their imple-
mentation was negotiated locally on a project-by-project basis and
depended on local contingencies. There was often a bargain over the
compensatory measures prescribed by the environmental authorities,
the outcome of which depended among others on the particular
development project at stake, the technical capacity and the ﬁnancial
health of the land developer. It would be excessive to describe them
as token measures, however they were often deﬁned on the basis of a
rule of thumb rather than of a scientiﬁc estimation of predictable
habitat losses and the application of a ratio to account for possible
restoration failures. Compensatory mitigation measures were decided
and implemented along with the development projects or after them,
without prior global scheme or land planning. The representations –
and hence the practice – of biodiversity offsets have evolved following
the liberal shift of the 1980s, the gradual dissemination of market
instruments in the ﬁeld of conservation policies and the populariza-
tion of the ‘no-net-loss of wetlands’ slogan during the Presidential
campaign of George H.W. Bush in 1988 (Robertson, 2004). The
principle of proportionality between compensatory mitigation mea-
sures and residual environmental damages has been asserted in this
context, leading to the notion of ecological equivalence.
However in most countries, this change in perspective and the
evolution of the functions assigned to offsetting mechanisms have
taken place in an unaltered legal framework. The take2 of endangered
or threatened species is considered as exceptional in nature, it is
subject to authorization and the land developer must follow the
mitigation hierarchy: offsetting measures are the last resort solution to
address residual environmental impacts of land development projects
after appropriate avoidance, minimization and restoration measures
have been applied. Biodiversity loss can to some extent be compen-
sated for through the preservation or restoration of a habitat that is
considered as equivalent to the affected one in terms of conservation
beneﬁts to the listed species. Until recently compensatory mitigation
measures were often implemented by the land developers themselves
or by specialized service providers theymandated. Conservation banks
offer an additional possibility for permittees to comply with their
regulatory obligations. The demand for credits depends on the
number of permits issued by the authorities upstream in the process.
The voluntary nature of the transaction is thus limited and debatable
from the point of view of the permittees: they are lawfully obliged to
carry out mitigation measures, but free to choose among several
options to perform this obligation. Furthermore, the obligation to
offset residual damages caused to biodiversity is not transferred to the
conservation bank through the purchase of credit. It is a personal
obligation. The purchase of credits cannot be strictly speaking
considered as a transfer of property rights, it merely enhances the
ﬂexibility of regulatory compliance.
3.1. The U.S. experience of conservation banking
As already mentioned, in the United States, the ESA makes it
unlawful to ‘take’ a listed species. In 1982, the ESA was amended to
authorize incidental taking of endangered species by private land-
owners and other non-federal entities provided they developed habitat
conservation plans (HCP) minimizing and mitigating the taking and
that received approval by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the
National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to §7. Conservation banking
was ﬁrst promulgated in the State of California in 1995. From the mid-
1990s, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has allowed credits from
conservation banks to be used to meet the requirements of the ESA.
Federal Guidance has been adopted in 2003 but it is quite informal,
especially compared to the Federal wetland compensatory mitigation
policy framework. The guidance is meant as a “collaborative incentive-
based approach to endangered species conservation” rather than as a
legally binding one (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2003; Bauer et al.,
2004) and it leaves room for interpretation and adaptation.
Conservation banks are established, used and operated within the
boundaries of the ESA. Their working is shaped and constrained by
deﬁnitions, categories, priorities, zoning, that are not questioned in
the context of the exchange of conservation credits. Endangered and
threatened species are listed at State and Federal levels, and an
administrative procedure is launched if a land development project
may result in an ‘incidental taking’. The land developer must provide
an ecological impact assessment of the project, estimate the potential
biodiversity loss and habitat destruction that might be induced by the
project and propose measures to mitigate or compensate these
damages in a Habitat Conservation Plan. The latter is assessed by
the FWS that decides to deliver – or not – a permit and prescribes
compensatory mitigation measures that can include the nature and
number of credits that the developer should purchase.
In parallel, in anticipation of future mitigation requirements, land-
owners invest in conservation activities at a site, which is called a
bank. These activities are not precisely deﬁned, they may include the
acquisition of high quality habitat, or the restoration of a degraded
habitat for one or several particular species, buffering of protected
2 ‘Take’ is deﬁned by the ESA as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”
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areas or connecting separated habitats. The bank project must be
assessed and approved by the FWS. State and local government
entities may impose additional environmental requirements. The
bankers must set up a ‘conservation banking agreement’ indicating a
management plan for the bank property, a description of the service
area, the number and kind of conservation credits within the bank and
the performance standards that it should meet (Bauer et al., 2004).
Credits are awarded for conservation outcomes—e.g. enhanced or
created habitats, number of nesting pairs; their issuance is therefore
conditional on the success of the management plan. Most importantly,
the conservation commitment made by landowners when they
establish a bank is permanent. They must convey a permanent con-
servation easement over the bank property and provide assurance of
long-term funding for the perpetual management of the property.
The ecological suitability of the site is one of the main criteria
considered in assessing the eligibility of a bank project. The banks
should be capable of either supporting a viable population of an
endangered species or contributing to the maintenance of the species
population by expanding an existing protected area managed for this
species. Public agencies are allowed to establish banks; it is a common
practice of state and local transportation departments for instance, but
most banks are privately owned and managed. The prospective
bankers often get into the conservation business because it is their
only option to develop their lands that host endangered species,
which it is illegal to harm. In a way, they try to make the best of a bad
hand (Carroll et al., 2008). As acknowledged by the Guidance (U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (2003): 1), “from the landowner’s perspective, it
provides a beneﬁt, an opportunity to generate income fromwhat may
have been previously considered a liability.” Establishing a bank can
also be a means to prevent the partition of a family heritage because
the conservation commitment made when establishing a bank is
permanent (Bauer et al., 2004). Landowners’ interests and access to
land are decisive in the choice of locations for conservation banks. In
this context, the environmental authorities cannot have a complete
control over the siting of the banks, but they strive to impose an
ecologically coherent global scheme. They perceive conservation
banking as a means to reinforce and secure centralized control of
conservation policies. The expectations attached to these emerging
institutional arrangements are not deﬁned in terms of market,
efﬁciency, ﬂexibility, or private property. Nor are these mechanisms
referred to as autonomous transactions. They are part of a land
planning approach to conservation. In the Guidance, when describing
the expected effects of conservation banking, greater emphasis is
placed on consistency, predictability, and the need to plan and
articulate private decentralized initiatives, than on the alleged efﬁ-
ciency of the latter (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2003).
The declared purpose of conservation banking is not to ensure ‘no
net loss’ or ecological equivalence. As stated in the Guidance (U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, 2003), “while in mitigation banking the goal is to
replace the exact function and values of the speciﬁc wetland habitats
that will be adversely affected by a proposed project, in conservation
banking the goal is to offset adverse impacts to a species. […] In
contrast to mitigation banks, an appropriate function of conservation
banks is the preservation of existing habitat with long-term conserva-
tion value to mitigate loss of other isolated and fragmented habitat that
has no long-term value to the species”. The location of the banks and
their management plans are not dictated by the imperative of full
compensation, they are guided by listed species conservation needs,
based on conservation biology principles. The establishment of con-
servation banks and the ensuing credit sales are not isolated indepen-
dent transactions with their own rationale; they form part of an overall
coherent ecological scheme. As a result, a wide range of projects are
eligible as conservation banks. The Guidance provides that “a bank
can be created in a number of different ways: (1) acquisition of exist-
ing habitat; (2) protection of existing habitat through conservation
easements; (3) restoration or enhancements of disturbed habitat;
(4) creation of new habitat in some situations; and (5) prescriptive
management of habitats for speciﬁed biological characteristics.”
In practice, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service tends to favour
preservation strategies over restoration, enhancement or creation
of habitats (Mead, 2008). Unless habitat maintenance requires
active management (e.g. control of invasive species, controlled
burning, grazing), mitigating damages to endangered species using
preserved habitats – rather than restoring degraded ones – could
result in a net loss of suitable habitat for a particular species.3
It is therefore difﬁcult to determine what the credits precisely
stand for; they are certainly not just a medium in an exchange of
equivalents, since there is no guarantee whatsoever that the
habitats destroyed and the habitats protected or recreated are
equivalent. In purchasing credits, land developers pay for the cost
of compliance. The transaction per se rather than the number of
credits actually exchanged is relevant in this respect.
The economization process at stake in conservation banking
can be assessed based on this outline of the U.S. system and on the
above description of the operations leading to turn ecosystem
parcels into commodities—individuation, reiﬁcation, abstraction
and measurement.
3.2. An incomplete commodiﬁcation process?
Beyond discourses, conservation banking mechanisms even
though fast expanding and highly publicized are still of minor practical
import in conservation policies, compared to more conventional
conservation tools. They may feature high in symbolic and rhetorical
terms, but they have not aroused a groundswell of support even in
United States. There are conservation banks only in a limited number
of states, concerning a limited number of endangered or threatened
species and types of habitats. Some of them even enjoy a de facto
monopoly position. The information on conservation banking is not
centralized, while in contrast an information system called RIBITS
(Regulatory In Lieu Fee and Bank Information Tracking System) has
been implemented for mitigation banking. Each transaction is there-
fore highly dependent on the particular setting within which it takes
place and the species considered. While the object of the transactions
is not completely different from one contract to the next, it is not the
same either, and a sequence of transactions is not sufﬁcient to support
integration or consolidation that could lead to a market.
As already mentioned, there is a distinct type of credit for each
species and each habitat type and for each of them different
ecological assessment methods can be used. According to a study
commissioned by the USDA Ofﬁce of Environmental Markets, more
than 40 distinct methods representing four main types of metrics are
applied to the assessment of habitats (Willamette Partnership,
2011).4 Based on a literature survey of biodiversity offsetting schemes
worldwide, Quétier and Lavorel (2011) identify, compare and con-
sider the merits and scope of validity of three main approaches to
assess ecological equivalence.5 These methodological reviews
bespeak the lack of common approach to habitat assessments. Thus,
even if the explicit objective of conservation banking were to achieve
ecological equivalence, the currency issue would be quite sensitive. It
is all the more complex since the federal legislation leaves room for
interpretation and adaptation. There is no established doctrine, and
3 Indeed, the credits issued by preservation banks are granted by the Service
against the committment of the bank managers to maintain existing habitats in
perpetuity. They do not involve net creation or protection of habitats, whereas they
can be bought to satisfy legal requirements, as compensation for habitat loss
elsewhere.
4 This report identiﬁes vegetation-based, species-based, functions-based, and
practice-based metrics (Willamette Partnership, 2011).
5 These approaches are labelled ‘circumstancial reasoning’, ‘standardized scor-
ing method’, and ‘standardized scoring method and like-for-similar correspon-
dence’ (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011).
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ultimately the onus is on the Service personnel to decide whether
particular conservation measures are proportionate. In practice, each
ecological assessment process is unique. Conservation banks can rely
on a range of strategies that all contribute towards the protection or
recovery of listed species, but may widely differ in terms of their
environmental impacts: preservation, management, restoration of
degraded habitats, buffering of already protected areas, or creation of
habitat (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2003). The credits issued in
these different contexts cover many different ecological realities.
In addition, the number of credits allocated to a bank project
and the number of credits to purchase to offset the detrimental
impacts of a land development project form the subject of distinct
assessments, carried out at different times, potentially with
different hypotheses and techniques, and possibly by using differ-
ent indicators, ratio, discounting and probability rating. It is
eventually difﬁcult to make sure that the supply and the demand
of credits actually have the same meaning.
Beyond the speciﬁc case of the U.S. conservation banking
system, the notion of credits as biodiversity currencies is therefore
problematical. As stated by Walker et al. (2009): 151, simple
biodiversity currencies are inadequate; they facilitate nominal
biodiversity accounting, but omit, obscure, or conceal biodiversity
features and noninterchangeabilities. No general equivalent, no
yardstick or standard has emerged from experience to date and
ecologists insist that this currency issue is probably intractable.
The lack of fungibility of the credits reﬂects an incomplete process
of abstraction. The ‘investments in form’ to develop typologies,
commensurability and deﬁne homogenous categories have not been
pushed to their conclusion. Habitats and biodiversity assets generally
speaking are situated, they cannot be separated from their context,
the social, cultural and environmental values attached to them in
their original location, and their evolutionary path (Brownlie et al.,
2013). Each transaction is thus unique and embedded in a particular
context from which it cannot be abstracted.
The institutional arrangements set up to ensure offsetting – e.g.,
the agency approval of the bank, the conversion of the conserva-
tion value of the bank into a ﬁxed number of credits by the FWS –
stem from local dynamics, bargains, and subjective assessment of
the seriousness, reliability and professionalism of the would-be
bankers. The outcome of transactions on credits depends on the
relationship established between the parties. It cannot be com-
pletely objectiﬁed and regarded as the sole product of the inherent
characteristics of what is being traded. As summarized by Walker
et al. (2009): 151 quoting Salzman and Ruhl (2000): 614, “Incom-
plete measurement, imprecise valuation, and noninterchangeabil-
ity mean biodiversity exchange is strictly not commodity trading,
but barter: “individuals haggling over goods and services with
unique attributes”.” There is no such thing as a price for credits,
rather something like bargaining mediated by money.
Accordingly, the sale of species or habitat credits relate to
biodiversity but do not involve biodiversity elements as such, rather
loosely deﬁned rights over habitats. These rights cannot be depicted
as property rights: the purchase of credits does not involve any
transfer of formal rights. Offsetting requirements are a matter of
personal obligation that cannot be transferred.
Finally, though often presented as an isolated contract between
conservation bankers and land developers to ﬁt the Coasian model of
bilateral negotiation, the exchange of credits is part of a far more
complex institutional setting. The ecological impact assessments, the
ecological restoration activities, the various legal agreements, con-
ventions and covenants and the trust fund that provides assurance of
long-term funding for the conservation banks involve recourse to
various forms of technical expertise that neither landowners nor land
developers do have. For these issues they rely on various brokers,
consultancies, and lawyers, who support them in preparing and
drawing up mandatory documents and contracts and assist them in
their dealing with authorities at the local, state and federal levels. The
organization of conservation banking is therefore very far from the
economic ideal of a direct supply-demand encounter. Beyond the
differences across countries, all the biodiversity banking systems take
place within a permit system, they are organized through bundles of
contracts, agreements and binding planning documents, involving
many stakeholders over the long term. The analysis of conservation
banking should adopt a holistic approach to this institutional con-
stellation and not be conﬁned to the sole purchase of habitat or
species credits by land developers.
Given these distinctive features, the conservation banking
schemes can hardly be termed “biodiversity markets”. The enlist-
ment of the private sector in conservation policies can be con-
sidered an omen of neoliberalization of nature. However the
participation is so tightly regulated and framed by law that it does
reveal the domination of an entrepreneurial form of nature
management typical of neoliberal governmentality,6 rather than
an actual commodiﬁcation of nature, even incomplete.
4. On the impact of presenting conservation banks as MBIs
As already noted above, featuring conservation banking schemes
as MBIs has performative effects. These schemes are not turned into
markets just because they are considered as such, but mitigation
policies are reshaped and redeﬁned by the pro-market narrative.
Some important aspects of the policy devices are ignored, some
actors, interventions and processes are made invisible, strong
assumptions are made about the working of the banks and their
performances that are not sustained by evidence. Complex negotia-
tions are presented as market-like exchange, and the land use
decisions made in compensation policies are interpreted as rational
choices inducing ecologically sound strategies. Monetary transactions
are brought to the fore at the expense of the numerous other
agreements, settlements, bargaining and arrangements that frame
biodiversity offsetting. The purchase of credits in conservation bank-
ing systems is often presented as a stand-alone agreement, while it is
entangled in a web of formal and informal rules and negotiations.
The role of the regulatory framework though quite visible in real-life
arrangements is not highlighted in many accounts of this mechan-
ism, especially in economics. However public intervention is not
limited to setting the scene, allocating property rights and creating a
level playing ﬁeld. Conservation banking entails a great degree of
intervention to award credits, deﬁne obligations, and assess habitats.
Fox and Nino-Murcia (2005) report that most of the bank owners
they met in the context of their survey of conservation banks in
United States complained about the bureaucratic burden implied by
this activity. Moreover some banks are managed by public bodies,
which goes largely unreported in the promotional discourse focusing
on private initiative and individual interests as well as in criticism.
Whereas the very justiﬁcation of compensatory mitigation is the
need to offset impacts occurring elsewhere, conservation banks tend
to be included in surveys of environmental policy instruments as tools
for the conservation of biodiversity. The positive side of the offset is
highlighted. The restoration of degraded habitats, the preservation and
management of others to enhance the provision of ecosystem services,
and the contribution of biodiversity offsets to species recovery are
advertised. In contrast, the negative side associated with habitat
destruction, which is its correlate, is comparatively less publicised.
This can be illustrated by the example of Cossure natural assets
reserve in France, established by CDC biodiversité, which is a private
subsidiary of a parastatal organization. CDC biodiversity has acquired
6 As deﬁned by Foucault in his Lectures at the College de France in 1978
(Foucault, 2004).
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land occupied by industrial orchards in the South of France, in the
Cossouls de Crau that is a unique semi-arid steppe ecosystem, home to
endangered bird species. The ecosystem was in a serious state of
deterioration and its rehabilitation through the removal and recycling
of irrigation pipes, ecological engineering, revegetation, and ecological
management of the site based on eco-pastoralism has produced
visible results (Chabran and Napoleone, 2012). This operation has
been used to showcase conservation banking in France and has
accordingly been presented in a very favourable light.7 However, the
conservation actions carried out to compensate for impacts occurring
elsewhere to the same resource, although presented as virtuous and
cost-efﬁcient can at best offset the depletion of biodiversity caused by
other projects and result in a zero-sum game. Given the wide gap
existing between the promises raised by the restoration science and
its practical achievements (Maron et al., 2012), these strategies actually
result in most cases in a net loss of endangered species habitat.
These systematic distortions and selectivity in the description
of existing institutions to have them conform with an economistic
worldview are reminiscent of Polanyi’s concept of ‘economistic
fallacy’, i.e. the assumption that all societies are founded on
market-exchange oriented individual action and should be mod-
elled accordingly. Values, economic rationality and market cate-
gories are projected onto institutions and natural environments
without due consideration of their reality. The criticism of con-
servation banking as commodiﬁcation of nature paradoxically
reinforces its representation as market or MBI. However, the
economization of endangered species and their habitats is not
necessarily a prelude to their commodiﬁcation. Measurement and
quantiﬁcation processes, typology setting and the deﬁnition of
conventions of equivalence are already well underway, but their
being part of a commodiﬁcation project is not obvious.
The development of conservation banking more or less along the
same lines as wetland mitigation banking is justiﬁed by a search for
efﬁciency. These mechanisms are allegedly a ﬂexible and cost-
efﬁcient means of meeting conservation requirements. From the
Service’s perspective, conservation banking reduces the piecemeal
approach to conservation efforts that can result from individual
projects by establishing larger reserves and enhancing habitat con-
nectivity (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2003: 1). Conservation
banking is therefore above all perceived as a streamlining strategy
rooted in managerial legitimacy. This organization of biodiversity
compensatory mitigation is praised for its technical performance and
functionality: the partition between supply and demand of credits,
and the spatial concentration of mitigation measures are expected to
bring transparency and accountability and to facilitate monitoring
and regulatory compliance. The ambitions or expectations attached
to conservation banking are summarized by Mann and Ashber
(2014): 74: On the one hand, these tradable permit systems promise
to reduce costs, dampen the adversarial nature of regulation and
support economic growth while still achieving regulatory and con-
servation goals. In addition, they are collaborative, enlisting market
and civic actors in the design and delivery of such policies, calling for
new forms of relationships between state and non-state actors in the
process of policy formulation and implementation. The case for
conservation banking is strengthened by supposedly compelling
environmental arguments: scientiﬁcally sound conservation strate-
gies would be easier to deﬁne and more likely to succeed in large
unfragmented regions (Sullivan, 2013). This common sense argu-
ment, appealing for its simplicity is however specious, as discussed
below. The choice of a land use strategy to ensure biodiversity
protection depends on the conservation targets. Under the pretence
of ecosystem protection, the same concern for managerial control is
reasserted. Conservation banking pertains to ‘technologies of power’
and its goals are deﬁned in terms of discipline and control rather
than mere commodiﬁcation.
The way conservation banking mechanisms have been developed
from the late 1990s and are put into perspective nowadays reﬂects
most of all the fact that market rhetoric has become pervasive in
environmental politics. The – mainly discursive – conversion of
environmental policy tools into MBIs, involving their reshaping and
reinterpretation to bring out their formal analogies with markets, has
become an end in itself.
If conservation banking systems had to be compared with existing
policy instruments, they could be interpreted as an adapted form of
transferable development rights (TDR) (OECD, 1999: 84; 2004;
Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002). TDRs are generally employed to
preserve historic heritage or the environment. They are used to guide
growth and development by focusing land-use change into targeted
geographic areas. TDR allows for the market transfer of development
rights from landowners in areas designated for preservation to land-
owners and developers for use in areas deemed appropriate for
development. TDRs involve therefore partial transfers of rights to
use land that, in a biodiversity management context, restrict activities
on ecologically sensitive private lands. These can include restrictions
on development, by implementing legally binding property covenants
or land management plans, both of which may be based on biodi-
versity management goals (OECD, 2004). Conservation banks and
their service areas are in a way similar to the ‘sending districts’. They
can sell credits to developers who look for solutions to implement
compulsory mitigation. These credits could be interpreted from the
bankers’ perspective as TDRs. Yet there are some differences between
the systems: the emission of credits is the raison d’être of the
conservation banks, not the unintended effect of restrictions due to
land planning or real estate legislation; TDRs can be stored or
transferred, which is not the case of species or habitat credits.
However such a parallel illustrates that conservation banking policy,
rather than an attempt at commodifying nature, is a land-sparing
policy (Phalan et al., 2011), favouring spatial segregation and specia-
lization. This land use approach supports the concentration of devel-
opment activities on built-up and intensively cultivated lands, so that
other areas can be set aside for conservation. This approach has not
proven to be more efﬁcient in terms of environmental protection than
land sharing, but it has not been discarded either (DeFries et al., 2004;
Fischer et al., 2011). However, if this model were disseminated in
densely populated areas with limited land reserves, for instance in
Europe, it would raise questions. Indeed it would probably give still
higher priority to the establishment of preservation banks – in other
words habitat maintenance – over restoration projects (for an account
of the UK experience, see Hannis and Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan, 2013),
with a risk to accentuate ecological inequalities and to cause an overall
decline of vulnerable habitats. Indeed, conservation efforts and
resources would be focused on already preserved areas, existing
ecologically important habitats, while the promise of their protection
in perpetuity guaranteed by the conservation easement would in
return justify ecosystem conversion elsewhere.
5. Conclusion
Featuring conservation banking mechanisms as MBIs reveals the
expectations of their promoters and the fears of their detractors
rather than their objective characteristics. The exchange of credits
always takes place in unique circumstances and setting. For localized
transactions to evolve into a market, it would be necessary to
centralize information, to homogenize credits and deﬁne currencies
for biodiversity, to enhance the transparency of exchanges and to
improve and standardize both habitat assessment methods and
7 For instance in a video entitled “Métamorphose: naissance d’une réserve
d’actifs naturels”, 2011.
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restoration techniques. As illustrated above, these preconditions are
far from being fulﬁlled.
The exchange of species or habitat credits cannot be described
as a voluntary transaction, at least not from the perspective of land
developers. The latter are indeed responsible for undertaking
appropriate offsetting measures but can choose how they will
fulﬁl this obligation. On the supply side, most banks are privately
owned and managed, but their activity is enshrined in regulations.
The location of the bank, the management plan, the number of
credits it can issue, and the agenda of credit release all depend on
prior administrative authorisation. In addition, the demand of
credits depends on the number of permits granted, hence on the
level of legal compliance. In most banking systems presently in
force, the credits cannot be hoarded.
Characterizing biodiversity banking schemes as markets or MBIs
would imply the identiﬁcation of the commodity traded. Habitat and
species related credits have been described by critics as ‘licences to
kill’ specimens of endangered species or licences to destroy their
habitats. However the permits are granted prior to the purchase of
credits, which cannot be considered as a way to ‘buy’ authorisation.
Given the complexity of the deﬁnition and measurement of ecolo-
gical equivalence, and the imprecise eligibility criteria applying to
mitigation measures, the credits cannot play the role of currency or
general equivalent. They may contribute to making exchanges more
ﬂuid, while keeping up the appearance of market regulation, but they
fundamentally pertain to a bartering logic.
In contrast to markets, there is no transfer of property rights
under these institutional arrangements: the permittees have a
personal obligation they cannot transfer to offset the residual
damages caused by their projects.
Rather than nature commodiﬁcation, the development of conserva-
tion banking probably reveals the domination of a managerial app-
roach to environmental policies inﬂuenced by engineering. Restoration
techniques, management practices and ecological engineering play a
decisive role in this respect, as well as land use planning and the spatial
concentration of the areas devoted to conservation. The delimitation of
development areas and conservation banks, and the deﬁnition of
distinct supply and demand for credit convey the notion of a
partitioned geographic and social space, allowing the functional
territorial specialization and the professionalization of the actors. The
economization of species and habitats is intended to rationalize and
reinforce the control over conservation policies and to improve the
production of processed nature.
However, a market imaginary literally pervades conservation bank-
ing policies. The references to no net loss and ecological equivalence,
even used metaphorically, can induce a normalization of habitat
destruction and foster the illusion that a processed nature could be
a surrogate for the lost one. Beyond offsetting methods, the simple fact
of conceptualizing conservation along these lines reduces environ-
mental policy to a balance sheet approach.
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